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Recent developments in cosmology indicate that every history
having a nonzero probability is realized in infinitely many distinct
regions of spacetime. Thus, it appears that the universe contains
infinitely many civilizations exactly like our own, as well as
infinitely many civilizations that differ from our own in any way
permitted by physical laws. We explore the implications of this
conclusion for ethical theory and for the doomsday argument. In
the infinite universe, we find that the doomsday argument applies
only to effects which change the average lifetime of all civilizations,
and not those which affect our civilization alone.
2Philosophical Implications of Inflationary Cosmology1
It is said that the ancient Greek philosopher Diodorus Cronos once
put forth a powerful argument for a peculiar view about the
relationship between the possible and the actual. Diodorus claimed
that everything that could possibly happen is either occurring right
now or will occur at some point in the future. His claim, in other
words, was that there are no unrealized possibilities. Unfortunately,
the works of Diodorus have been lost, and although a number of
modern philosophers have tried valiantly to reconstruct his
argument, no one really knows exactly how it was supposed to go.
Nonetheless, we think that Diodorus’s conclusion was
essentially correct, and we will here provide a new, entirely modern
argument for it. Unlike the original argument of Diodorus, however,
our argument draws on inflationary cosmology and quantum
mechanics. It follows from inflationary cosmology that the universe
is infinite and can therefore be divided into an infinite number of
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3regions of any given size. But it follows from quantum theory that
the total number of histories that can occur in any one of these
regions in a finite time is finite. Drawing on these two premises, we
argue for the conclusion that all possible histories are realized in
some region of the universe.
Ultimately, then, the argument is more a scientific theory than
a philosophical account, and it has already been presented as such
elsewhere (Garriga & Vilenkin 2001). Still, we feel that the theory
has important implications for issues that have traditionally been
the concern of philosophers. It is these philosophical implications
that will be our focus here. We therefore proceed in two steps. First,
we provide a condensed, non-technical explanation of the argument.
Then we explore the implications of this argument for questions
about modality, ethics, and doomsday.
I. Physics Background
The assertions that the universe is infinite and that the
number of possible histories in a finite spacetime region is finite are
crucial for our argument. Here, we shall briefly discuss the physical
4origin of these claims and provide some references where further
details can be found.
The number of possible histories is finite
Suppose we pick a region of space and an interval of time. This
defines a region of spacetime. We want to consider histories that can
occur in this spacetime region. If we divide the space in such a
region into small subregions, we can define a history as a
specification of the contents of each subregion at successive
moments of time.
Quantum mechanics assigns a probability to each of the
histories, and we say that a history is possible if its probability is not
equal to zero. This includes a very wide class of histories, since in
quantum mechanics anything that is not strictly forbidden has a
nonzero probability. The only histories that are excluded are the
ones that violate some exact conservation laws, like the conservation
of energy or of electric charge.
It can be shown, however, that there are only finitely many
distinct histories that can occur in any finite spacetime region. One
might think that the subregions and the intervals between moments
5of time could be made arbitrarily small, and the contents specified
arbitrarily precisely, so the number of possibilities should be
infinite. But if one tries to make the division or specification too
fine, the division into histories is no longer well-defined, due to the
quantum mechanical uncertainty.2 The number of possible histories
in the observable part of the Universe has been estimated as 1010150.
This is a fantastically huge number, but the important point is that
this number is finite.
We now introduce some input from the theory of inflation. As
we review in the next subsection, it follows from this theory that the
universe is spatially infinite. It can therefore be subdivided into an
infinite number of regions of any given size. Thus, we have an
infinite number of regions and only a finite number of histories that
can unfold in them. Every possible history has a nonzero probability
and will therefore occur in an infinite number of regions.3
                                    
2 Here we present a rather informal version of the argument. See Garriga and
Vilenkin (2001) for more details.
3 Prior to Garriga and Vilenkin (2001), a similar argument was given by Ellis and
Brundrit (1979), who discussed the implications of the assumptions that the
universe is infinite and approximately homogeneous. They argued that there
6The universe is infinite
The material in this subsection is not necessary for the
understanding of the rest of the paper, so readers interested only in
the philosophical implications of the theory (and willing to accept
our assertions) can skip to the next subsection.
The claim that the universe is infinite is a consequence of the
theory of inflation. This theory began as a speculative hypothesis
when it was proposed by Alan Guth (1981), but it is now well on its
way to becoming one of the cornerstones of modern cosmology. The
central role in the theory is played by a peculiar form of matter —
known as ‘false vacuum’ — which is characterized by high energy
and strong repulsive gravitational field. Here, the word “false”
                                                                                                            
should be some regions in such a universe with histories very similar to that in
our region. Our discussion here goes beyond that of Ellis and Brundrit in two
respects: (i) the spatial infinity of the universe in our picture is a consequence of
the theory of inflation and does not have to be independently postulated, and (ii)
we argued that the number of distinct histories is finite, which allowed us to
conclude that there should be regions with histories not only similar, but identical
to ours.
7alludes to the fact that this type of vacuum is unstable and decays
into ordinary (true) vacuum. Inflation is an epoch of super-fast,
accelerated cosmic expansion, driven by the repulsive gravity of
false vacuum. Decay of the false vacuum marks the end of inflation
and plays the role of the big bang in this theory.
One of the striking aspects of inflation is that, generically, it
never ends in the entire universe. False vacuum decay is a
probabilistic process; it does not occur everywhere simultaneously.
Regions like ours, where inflation has ended, can be called ‘island
universes,’ because they are like islands in the ever-inflating sea of
false vacuum. Because of inflation, the space between island
universes rapidly expands, making room for more island universes
to form (Vilenkin 1983; Linde 1986; for a recent review, see Guth
2000).
If an observer were somehow able to view the process of
inflation from the outside, she would see each island universe grow
with time, as the false vacuum decays in the inflating regions
adjacent to it. It would therefore appear to this observer that the big
bang occurs at different times in different parts of each island
universe, with the most recent being at its periphery, where the
8island universe is advancing into the inflating sea.  In the limit of
infinite time, the size of the island universe becomes unboundedly
large.
On the other hand, for the inhabitants of the island universe,
it is more natural to take the big bang as the origin of time. For
them, the progressive “bang” seen by the external observer happens
all at once, and they perceive the spatial extent of their island
universe to be infinite. The inflating region of spacetime is in their
past, so they cannot travel there, nor can they travel to other island
universes. Thus, each island universe appears to its inhabitants as a
self-contained, infinite universe.
The eternally inflating spacetime contains an unlimited
number of such island universes. However, since each island
universe is itself spatially infinite, it is sufficient for our purposes to
consider a single island universe.
II. Frequency and Probability
The theory of inflation has surprising consequences for our
intuitive understanding of frequency. On this intuitive
9understanding, it seems that one should be able to obtain exact
frequencies by counting up the total quantities of certain objects
and then doing some simple arithmetic. Thus, suppose that we are
wondering about the frequency with which planets in the universe
contain life. Intuitively, it may appear that the exact answer to our
question could be obtained by counting up all the planets in the
universe that contain life and then dividing by the total number of
planets in the universe.
The theory of inflation shows that this approach is
unworkable. Since the universe contains infinitely many planets and
infinitely many planets that contain life, no sense can be attached to
the notion of a quotient obtained by dividing the number of planets
that contain life by the total number of planets. Still, there is a
certain sense in which we can speak of the “frequency” with which
planets contain life. We start out by taking a finite region of space,
selected in a way that is unbiased with regard to the phenomenon to
be investigated (Vilenkin 1998). Then we can look at the ratio of the
planets containing life to the total number of planets in that one
finite region. As we consider ever larger regions, this ratio will
converge. The frequency with which planets in our universe contain
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life can then be defined as the limit of this ratio as the region
becomes ever larger.
Using this revised definition of frequency, it can be shown that
the frequency of an event is simply equal to its probability. In other
words, if quantum mechanics tells us that some given type of event
occurs with probability x, we can infer that that type of event also
occurs with frequency x.
We can now introduce the aspect of the theory from which the
chief philosophical implications will be derived. Although there is
an extremely small probability that any given region will contain a
planet exactly like our own — with exactly the same sorts of
organisms, exactly the same configurations of land and ocean, and
so forth — the theory of inflation nonetheless permits us to
conclude that there are infinitely many such planets in the universe.
Moreover, the theory allows us to conclude that the universe
contains infinitely many planets that diverge from ours in specific
ways, with the frequency of each type of diverging planet
corresponding exactly to its probability.
Thus, consider our planet as it was 300 million years ago.
Given the exact state of our planet at that time, it would be possible
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(at least in principle) to assign probabilities to various outcomes.
There was a certain probability that the planet would eventually
come to contain mammals, a far smaller probability that the planet
would eventually come to contain human beings, and so forth. In
fact, there was a certain probability that the earth would eventually
come to contain a human being exactly like you, in surroundings
exactly like the ones you now inhabit, reading a philosophy paper
exactly like the one you are reading right now. This last probability
is extremely small — so small that we could normally afford to
ignore it. But although the probability is extremely small, it is surely
above zero.
 The theory of inflation now allows us to conclude that, 300
million years ago, the universe contained infinitely many planets
exactly like our own. These various planets then underwent various
different histories, with the frequency of each history coming out
precisely equal to its probability. A certain portion contain
mammals, a smaller portion contain humans, and a still smaller
portion — almost unfathomably small, but still nonzero — contain a
person exactly like you.
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Our own planet can therefore be seen as one element in an
infinite ensemble of planets. Indeed, our planet can be seen as an
element in a number of different infinite ensembles — the ensemble
of all planets in the universe, the ensemble of all planets that
contain intelligent life, the ensemble of all planets that are exactly
like our own in every respect, and so on. In the later sections of the
present paper, we argue that a number of important philosophical
implications can be derived when we regard our civilization as an
element of one or another of these ensembles.
III. Inflation Contrasted
We pause here to compare our theory with three philosophical
views that may appear (at least on some superficial level) to
resemble it.
Throughout this section, our chief aim is to differentiate the
theory of inflation from certain philosophical views with which it
might be confused. At no point will we be arguing that the theory of
inflation somehow provides evidence in favor of these views. Nor
will we claim that it functions as a competing theory, such that if the
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theory of inflation is true, these other views must be false. Rather,
we claim that the philosophical views are directed primarily at
questions other than the one that the theory of inflation is designed
to answer. (Two of the philosophical views are concerned primarily
with metaphysical questions; the third is concerned primarily with
ethical questions.) By contrasting the theory of inflation with these
philosophical ideas, we hope to clarify and further explain certain
aspects of the theory itself.
Modal realism
First, we should acknowledge that the theory of modal realism,
as formulated by David Lewis (1986), appears to yield the very same
conclusion that we have been defending thus far. Lewis is clearly
committed to the view that there are infinitely many regions of any
given size. Moreover, Lewis is committed to the view that every
possible history is realized in at least one region. It may therefore
appear that the theory of inflation is just a more complicated way of
arriving at the conclusions that fall naturally out of Lewis’s modal
realism.
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But this appearance is misleading. Although the theory of
inflation and modal realism seem to be making similar claims, they
are in fact concerned with quite different subject matters, and they
should therefore be regarded as entirely independent. By defending
the theory of inflation, we are not taking a position either way on
the truth or falsity of modal realism.
Modal realism is the thesis that all possible worlds truly exist.
Thus, the modal realist claims that we happen to be living in one
world (the actual world) but that there are also other possible
worlds and these other worlds are no less real than our own. On this
view, the various possible worlds are entirely isolated from one
another. They are not connected to each other in space and time,
and there can be no causal connections between events in distinct
worlds. Modal realism does imply that every possible history is
realized in at least one region, but that is not because modal realism
makes any controversial claims about the structure of the actual
world. Rather, the modal realist asserts that, in addition to the
actual world, there are infinitely many other possible worlds in
which additional possibilities can be realized. Indeed, since the
modal realist defines possibility in terms of possible worlds, the
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modal realist sees it as a mere tautology that every possible history
is realized in a region of at least one possible world.
By contrast, the theory of inflation is a thesis about the actual
world. The theory makes no claims about ‘other worlds’ or ‘parallel
universes.’ All of the regions posited by the theory are located in the
very same spacetime that we now inhabit. Thus, when we say that
every possible history is realized in infinitely many regions, we are
making a straightforward physical claim about regions of our
universe. 4 Most of these regions are extremely far away, but they
                                    
4 Thus, the theory of inflation should also be distinguished from many-world
interpretation of quantum mechanics (Deutsch 1998; DeWitt 1970; Everett 1957).
According to this interpretation, the wave function of the universe describes a
multitude of disconnected universes with all possible histories — a picture
reminiscent of the one that follows from the theory of inflation. However, the
reality of the other universes in the many-world theory is still a matter of
controversy (see, e.g., Brown & Davies 1993), whereas the ensemble of regions
that we discuss in this paper is unquestionably real. (We emphasize that the
picture of the universe presented here is independent of the interpretation of
quantum mechanics. If the many-worlds interpretation is adopted, then there is
an ensemble of disconnected, eternally inflating universes, each having an infinite
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are connected to us by ordinary spatio-temporal relations, and they
all share a common causal origin.
For this reason, the theory of eternal inflation is immune to an
objection that has sometimes been leveled against modal realism.
The objection runs something like this: “Since events in our own
world are supposed to have no causal connection to events in other
worlds, it seems that we can never really learn anything about any
world other than our own. Any claim made about other possible
worlds must be pure speculation, unsupported by the usual
procedures of scientific inquiry.” To illustrate this claim, Richards
(1975) asks how we might go about deciding whether or not there is
a possible world in which Saul Kripke is the son of Rudolf Carnap.
Clearly, we cannot go into another possible world and observe its
inhabitants. Nor can we observe anything that stands in any causal
relations to the inhabitants of other possible worlds. It therefore
appears that we can never acquire any evidence at all about what is
going on outside our own world.
                                                                                                            
number of regions, where all possible histories unfold. Our picture should apply
to each of the universes in the ensemble.)
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We do not wish to take a position either way about whether or
not this is a valid objection to modal realism, but we do want to
emphasize that the theory of inflation is not vulnerable to a parallel
objection. The theory of inflation is a scientific theory, and it can
therefore be supported by observational evidence. Of course,
someone might argue as follows: “All events outside the observable
region are, by definition, unobservable. Therefore, we cannot gain
any knowledge about events outside the observable region, and we
can never know whether or not every possible history is realized in
at least one region.” But this argument is without force. First of all, it
isn’t necessarily true that we will never be able to observe events
outside the observable region. Although we are not now able to
observe such events, we may be able to observe them at some future
time. (Indeed, we may even be able to travel to parts of the universe
that fall outside the presently observable region.5) More
                                    
5 Travel to remote regions may or may not be possible, depending on the nature
of the dark energy causing the accelerated expansion of the universe. If the dark
energy density is constant, we will not be able to travel beyond the presently
observable universe. But if the dark energy vanishes over time, then there is no
limit on how far we can travel.
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importantly, however, it seems clear that we can gain evidence
about events in remote regions of the universe without ever actually
observing those events. Drawing on evidence from the observable
region, we can construct and test physical theories. These theories
will then generate predictions about events outside the observable
region, and insofar as we have reason to believe the theories, we
have reason to believe the predictions they generate. In other words,
even if we are never able to make observations concerning events
outside the presently observable region, our knowledge of the
presently observable region may permit us to make justifiable
inferences concerning events in other parts of the universe.
Actualism
Consider now the strong form of determinism according to
which nothing can possibly happen other than what actually does
happen. A proponent of such a theory would say, e.g., that if we
have actually decided to write this paper, we could not possibly
have decided not to write the paper, indeed that our lives could not
19
have been even slightly different from the way they actually are.
Following Ayers (1968), we refer to this view as actualism.6
It may appear that the actualist arrives ultimately at the very
same conclusion that we have been defending thus far. After all, it
seems that actualism and the theory of inflation are simply two
different routes to the conclusion that everything possible is actual
— with the only major difference being that actualism claims that
surprisingly few things are possible whereas the theory of inflation
claims that surprisingly many things are actual.
But here again, appearances are deceiving. The slogan
“Everything possible is actual” conceals an important ambiguity,
and although this slogan could be appropriated with equal justice
by either actualism or the theory of inflation, it would have very
different meanings in these two different theoretical contexts.
The actualist asserts that there is only one possible history in
any given region. By contrast, the theory of inflation does not
                                    
6 In more recent work, the word ‘actualism’ is normally used to refer to the view
that only the actual world truly exists (e.g., Adams 1981). Note that we are here
using the word in an older sense, such that it refers to the view that only actual
events are possible.
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challenge the assumption that, in any given region, there are a
variety of distinct possible histories. Rather, what the theory asserts
is that all of these possible histories will be realized in some region
of the universe. Thus, although only one of the possible histories
will be actual in the region that we now inhabit, all possible histories
will be actual somewhere.
This distinction between actualism and the theory of inflation
becomes especially important when applied to human affairs. The
actualist says that we could not possibly have decided not to write
this paper. But the theory of inflation doesn’t challenge the
assumption that we could have decided not to write the paper; it
simply implies that, no matter what we decided, three people
exactly like us would have ended up writing a paper exactly like this
one in some region of the universe.
In a certain sense, then, the theory of inflation is the opposite
of actualism. Daniel Dennett has said that we need to “stave off
actualism” with “elbow room” that “prevents the possible from
shrinking tightly around the actual” (Dennett 1984, p. 145, 162)
The theory of inflation instead posits an infinite amount of space
that permits the actual to grow to fit the possible.
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Eternal recurrence
We turn now to a third philosophical idea that seems to
resemble the theory of eternal inflation: Nietzsche’s doctrine of the
eternal recurrence. The doctrine is notoriously difficult to interpret,
as Nietzsche’s published works don’t include any passages in which
he presents it in his own words. All interpretations must therefore
be based entirely on Nietzsche’s unpublished notes and on passages
from the published works in which Nietzsche presents his views
through fictional stories.
One of these passages describes a conversation between the
fictional prophet Zarathustra and an unnamed dwarf. Zarathustra
begins by setting forth a vision that is strikingly similar to the
theory we have been offering thus far:
 ‘Must not all things that can happen have already happened,
been done, run past?
 ‘And if all things have been here before: what do you think of
this moment, dwarf? Must not this gateway, too, have been here —
before? (Z III, § 2; cf. WP, §1066)
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But then, drawing on a wholly deterministic account of the relation
between past and future, Zarathustra uses these considerations to
argue for a conclusion that differs from our own:
 ‘And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that
this moment draws after it all future things? Therefore — draws
itself too?’
‘… and must we not return and run down that other lane out
before us, down that long, terrible lane — must we not return
eternally?’ (Z III, § 2)
Nietzsche scholars disagree about how passages like these should be
interpreted. Some claim that Nietzsche is literally advancing a claim
about the nature of the universe: namely, that every event that we
now observe will recur an infinite number of times (Danto 1965).
Others say that the doctrine of eternal recurrence should be
understood not as a literal claim about the nature of the universe
but rather as a metaphor that we can use to think about our lives.
On this latter view, the idea is that we ought to live our lives as
though everything we did were going to recur an infinite number of
times (Nehamas 1985). Either way, it is clear that Nietzsche meant
his doctrine of the eternal recurrence to have profound implications
for our ordinary decisions.
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Here it might be helpful to consider a more concrete example.
Consider a novelist who is wondering whether to continue working
on his book or just to relax for a moment and watch a sit-com on
television. And now suppose the novelist comes to believe that,
whichever action he chooses to perform, that action will end up
being performed an infinite number of times. It seems that the
novelist’s decision would then acquire an enormous significance,
what Nietzsche calls “the greatest weight” (GS §341). But, of course,
it isn’t really necessary for the novelist literally to believe that his
action will be performed an infinite number of times. He might
simply imagine that his life will recur eternally and then think about
whether he would be willing to have an evening of TV-watching
repeat again and again for all eternity.
Although the theory of inflation seems at least somewhat
similar to the doctrine of eternal recurrence, it would be wrong to
suppose that the theory of inflation has the same implications for
human life. Like the doctrine of eternal recurrence, the theory of
inflation says that every action you choose to perform will be
performed an infinite number of times. But unlike the doctrine of
eternal recurrence, the theory of inflation also says that every
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possible action you choose not to perform will be performed an
infinite number of times. To get a sense for the force of this claim,
consider again the novelist facing a decision about how to spend his
evening, this time assuming that he has come to accept the theory of
inflation. The novelist will then conclude that there are infinitely
many people exactly like him and that each member of this infinite
ensemble faces a choice between working and watching television.
However, he will not feel that these other people stand to him in any
relation of causal dependence.7 Nor will he believe that their choices
must necessarily be identical to his own. On the contrary, he will
reach precisely the opposite conclusion: that no matter which
                                    
7 Here our novelist appears to be faced with a complex problem in decision
theory. If he chooses to work on his novel, he will be maximizing the expected
frequency with which his counterparts throughout the universe chose to work on
their respective novels. (After all, it is highly probable that the majority of his
counterparts will end up choosing the same option that he himself chooses.) But
since he cannot actually have any causal impact on these counterparts, we will
assume that it would be a mistake for him to try to maximize the expected
frequency with which they perform a particular action. In other words, we will
presuppose that he ought to act in accordance with some version of causal
decision theory.
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option he chooses to select, an infinite number of people exactly like
him will end up selecting some other option. Thus, he will conclude
that, even if he chooses to relax and watch television, an infinite
number of people exactly like him will choose to keep working on
the novel.
IV. Ethical Implications
Since the theory of inflation leads in this way to the opposite
conclusion from the doctrine of eternal recurrence, one might think
that the theory of inflation should have the opposite effect on the
way people think about their lives. Just as the doctrine of eternal
recurrence makes every decision seem extremely weighty or
important, one might think that the theory of inflation makes every
decision seem insignificant or inconsequential. A defender of such a
view could say: “We already know that infinitely many good events
will occur and that infinitely many bad events will occur. We know,
for example, that infinitely many people exactly like our novelist
will finish their work and that infinitely many will leave their work
unfinished. Nothing that anyone does can ever change this. So why
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should it be a matter of any real concern whether some given
person happens to choose one option or the other?”
To evaluate this argument, we need to distinguish among a
number of different ways in which a person might have a deep
concern with her own decisions. We can then ask, for each of these
types of concern, what impact the theory of inflation ought to have.
First, let us consider irreducibly de se concerns — i.e.,
concerns that relate in some essential way to one’s own self
(Castañeda 1966; Lewis 1979). To take a simple example, imagine a
person who wants to go jogging. Presumably, her aim is not that all
people of some general type go jogging. Rather, her aim is that she
herself go jogging. To the extent that a person’s concerns have this
de se character, they should be relatively unaffected by knowledge
of the theory of inflation. After all, suppose the person knows full
well that there are infinitely many people exactly like her, and
suppose she knows that, no matter what she does, infinitely many of
these people will go jogging and infinitely many will not go jogging.
This knowledge may have little or no bearing on her real concern.
Her concern is not with what happens to all of those other people
but with what happens to her. She is concerned about whether or
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not she ends up going jogging, and the fact that there are infinitely
many people exactly like her seems not to affect the issue in any
way.
Similar remarks apply to those who are concerned with
particular objects, events or people. Take the father who feels a
special concern for his own daughter. Even if he discovers that
remote regions of the universe contain other people who resemble
his daughter in every possible respect, he might find that he cares
far more about his own daughter than he does about any of these
other people (Frankfurt 1999). Suppose, e.g., that such a man sees
his daughter crying and runs to comfort her. If he accepts the
theory of inflation, he can conclude that the universe contains an
infinite number of events exactly like the one he is now witnessing
— an infinite number of girls exactly like his daughter, all feeling
upset in exactly the same way for exactly the same reason. However,
this conclusion will not lead him to regard his own action as any less
consequential. He will not feel frustrated to learn that he is helping
only one member of an infinite population. Rather, he will feel that
his own daughter has some special importance — an importance
that no other person can share — and that he is therefore
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accomplishing something important by making sure that she
receives adequate comfort.
But now suppose we turn to a person who is concerned with
the total quantity of something in the world. Such a person might
donate money to the Audubon Society in the hope of increasing the
total quantity of goldfinches. Or, in a more philosophical moment,
the person might think that morality is a matter of increasing the
total quantity of happiness in the universe. Here there really does
seem to be a problem. If there are infinitely many goldfinches in the
world, it seems that one cannot increase their total quantity by
donating to the Audubon Society. Similarly, if there is already an
infinite quantity of happiness, one cannot increase that quantity by
engaging in altruistic activities. (Of course, one can engage in
activities that cause some people to be happier and don’t cause any
people to be less happy — but this result is not correctly described
as involving a net increase in any total quantity.) To determine
whether or not this sort of concern should be affected by knowledge
of inflation, one has to ask oneself whether it is truly the total
quantity that matters. Is it necessary that one actually increase the
total quantity of goldfinches? Or would it be sufficient merely to
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perform an action that added some goldfinches to the world without
subtracting any away? Or would it perhaps be sufficient to increase
the total quantity of goldfinches around here without having any
effect at all on the total quantity of goldfinches in the world as a
whole?
Similarly with concerns about total happiness. In a universe
populated with infinitely many people, it is clear that we can do
nothing to alter the total quantity of happiness. It is not clear,
however, whether or not this fact should have any profound impact
on our moral views. If the motivation behind the ‘total happiness’
principle truly is bound up with maximization of some total
quantity, then the theory of inflation should lead adherents of this
principle to revise their views in some radical way. On the other
hand, if the motivation really lies in some other kind of concern
(e.g., in causing more happiness than one prevents), and if phrases
like ‘total happiness’ serve only as a helpful way of articulating this
concern, then adherents of the total happiness principle simply
need to make a few technical changes in the way they describe their
view.
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Finally, let us consider cases in which a person is specifically
concerned with uniqueness. An art collector may value a particular
painting on the grounds that, in the whole world, there has never
been anything quite like it. A scientist may derive a special kind of
pride from thoughts like “I am the only person ever to have
developed this key insight.” An environmentalist may ascribe a
special importance to a specific herd of animals on the grounds that
they are the only remaining specimens of their species. Here again,
the theory of inflation may indicate that something has gone wrong.
When claims of uniqueness are taken in the most literal sense, the
theory of inflation can show that they are false. Thus, the art
collector is wrong to think that there are literally no paintings in the
entire world exactly like the one she now possesses. The truth is that
there are infinitely many paintings exactly like hers; it’s just that
they are so far away that she will never be able to observe them. The
important question, then, is whether it really matters that a
particular object or event be literally unique. Does it really matter,
for example, that the painting be literally the only one of its kind in
the entire universe? Or is it sufficient that the painting be the only
one of its kind within a 10100 parsec radius?
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This sort of question becomes especially pressing when
applied to the concern we feel about the continuing existence of our
own civilization. The theory of inflation tells us that the universe
contains an infinite number of civilizations exactly like ours. Thus,
even if our own civilization is entirely destroyed over the course of
the next century, the theory tells us that an infinite number of other
civilizations exactly like ours will continue to exist. Does the theory
therefore give us a reason to feel less concerned about nuclear wars,
asteroid collisions and other events that might destroy our
civilization? Here again, the answer will depend on why exactly we
were concerned about the possibility of this destruction in the first
place. If we were concerned because we valued particular people or
particular institutions that now inhabit the earth, then the theory
should have no effect on our feelings. But if we were concerned
because we felt that our civilization was somehow unique — so that
if our civilization were destroyed, the universe would no longer
contain anything even remotely like the presently-existing human
race — then the theory tells us that our concern was based on a
false assumption.
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Presumably, the concern that we actually feel is based on a
complex combination of different beliefs, desires and emotions.
Some of these should be affected by the theory of inflation; others
should not. It therefore remains to be seen whether the theory
should have any substantial impact on our overall attitude toward
the continuing existence of our civilization.
V. Universal Doomsday
As discussed above, the theory of inflation implies that we are
part of an infinitely large “island universe” that contains an infinite
number of civilizations. According to the anthropic principle
(codified, for example, as the “self-sampling assumption”; Bostrom
2002) we should reason as if we were randomly selected from all the
individuals in all those civilizations.  Thus our expectation of
finding ourselves in any particular circumstances is proportional to
the number of observers in those circumstances. We now want to
ask whether it is possible to use information about our own
circumstances to make inferences about the average lifetimes of
civilizations in our universe.
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First, it is clear that there is some nonzero probability for a
civilization to survive early threats to its existence (nuclear war,
asteroid impact, etc.). Such a civilization might go on to spread
across its galaxy. It could endure for millions of years and contain a
huge number of individuals. We will refer to such civilizations as
long-lived. On the other hand, some civilizations will succumb to
existential threats and so be short-lived. What will be the fraction of
each?
Unless the fraction of long-lived civilizations is tiny, nearly all
individuals will belong to them, and furthermore will live late in
their civilizations when most of the individuals live. That, however,
is not the circumstance in which we find ourselves. Instead, we find
that we live either in a short-lived civilization or very early in a
long-lived one. While we do not have a clear idea of how long to
expect civilizations to last, when we take into account our
circumstances, we should clearly update our ideas in favor of a
much larger chance for civilizations to be short-lived (Carter
unpublished; Leslie 1996 p. 231). Thus unless we previously
thought that long-lived civilizations were much more likely, we
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should now think that almost all civilizations will be short-lived — a
sort of ‘universal doomsday.’
The ‘universal doomsday’ argument that we advance here
should be carefully distinguished from the classic doomsday
argument (Carter unpublished; Gott 1993; Leslie 1989; 1996;
Nielsen 1989). The classic doomsday argument was an attempt to
show that our present circumstances give us some reason to believe
that our own particular civilization will soon come to an end. The
argument advanced here is quite different. We make no claims
regarding the longevity of any particular civilization. Rather, we say
that our present circumstances give us reason to reach a general
conclusion about our universe: namely, that long-lived civilizations
are extremely infrequent in our universe as a whole.
Moreover, as we now proceed to argue, the theory of inflation
gives us reason to reject the particular doomsday argument,
accepting only the universal doomsday argument. Thus, the
doomsday argument has nothing to say specifically about our own
civilization as distinct from others. Instead it tells us about the
general longevity of civilizations sufficiently similar to ours to be
included in the same reference class — although, of course, what we
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learn about civilizations in general, we should also apply to
ourselves.
Application to our civilization in particular
Traditionally, the doomsday argument has been applied to the
future of our own particular civilization. The observation is that we
are very early in our own civilization if our race turns out to be
long-lived, whereas we are typically situated if it is short-lived. The
principle is that we should expect to be typical among our own
civilization and the conclusion is that it is much more likely that our
civilization will be short-lived.
But if the theory of inflation is correct, there is no reason to
suppose that we could only have been in the particular civilization
in which we happen to find ourselves. There is some controversy
about which individuals should be included in the reference class
among which we should expect to be typical, but it should be clear
that we must at least include all observers subjectively
indistinguishable from ourselves (Bostrom 2002). However, the
theory of inflation implies that there are infinitely many such
observers, belonging to civilizations with every possible lifespan.
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Now suppose that we are typical among humans in the various
human civilizations in our universe. Then, before we take account of
our birth rank, it is much more likely that we would be in one of the
long-lived ones, rather than one of the short-lived ones. (After all,
there are many more people living in each long-lived civilization
than in each short-lived civilization.) This effect exactly cancels out
the impact of the particular doomsday argument, leaving us with
the conclusion that our chances that we are now in a long-lived or a
short-lived civilization are just proportional to the prevalence of
such civilizations (Bostrom 2002; Dieks 1992; Olum 2002). Thus, if
the theory of inflation is correct, the doomsday argument has
nothing to say about the longevity of our specific civilization, but
only about the general longevity of civilizations sufficiently similar
to ours to be included in the same reference class.
At this point, one might object that similar considerations
could be used to defeat the universal doomsday argument. Thus,
one might suggest that we are typical not merely among all those
individuals in our universe, but rather among all those individuals
who might exist according to alternative theories of the universe, if
we don’t know which theory is correct. If the universe developed in
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some probabilistic way before the beginning of inflation, so that
early chance events affected all regions together, then one can
consider also the possible observers who might exist as a result of all
different early developments. Including all such possible observers
in the reference class is equivalent to accepting the self-indication
assumption (SIA) (Bostrom 2002), first introduced by Dieks (1992),
which states that the chance that you would exist at all is greater in
a universe which contains more observers. If one accepts SIA, then a
universe with long-lived civilizations is more likely because of the
greater number of individuals that it contains, and that effect
exactly cancels the doomsday argument. However, for the purposes
of the present paper we will consider the consequences of denying
SIA.8
Universal vs. particular dooms
Some effects which might shorten the life expectancy of our
civilization apply only to ours specifically, while others shorten the
                                    
8 For recent discussions of arguments for and against SIA, see Olum (2002) and
Bostrom and Cirkovic (2003).
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general life expectancy of all civilizations. For example, suppose that
we are concerned with the earth being hit by an asteroid. The
chance of such a collision, in the next century say, is roughly the
number of asteroids in the solar system times the chance that any
given asteroid is on a course which will hit the earth during that
period.
Now a specific asteroid which happens to be on a collision
course with us is a “particular doom” that affects only us. The fact
that the asteroid has, by chance, the doomsday orbit says nothing
about other asteroids in other solar systems like ours. The particular
orbit of the asteroid is unrelated to the distribution of civilizations
that will or will not be destroyed by asteroids. Given the theory of
inflation, there is thus no reason to believe that such orbits are
more likely than one would first think.
On the other hand, the total number of asteroids could well be
determined by some universal process of solar system formation
and most solar systems like ours would have similar numbers of
asteroids. Therefore if the (incompletely known) process that
produces asteroid belts turns out to produce an especially large
number of asteroids, the lifetimes of all civilizations would be on
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average shortened. Large numbers of asteroids are a “universal
doom” that (statistically) affects all civilizations, and thus the
doomsday argument makes them more likely.
Practical applications
The doomsday argument has practical applications. If you
accept it, you should be more concerned about the possibility of
extinction and more willing to spend your effort on averting those
possible dooms over which you feel you might have some control.
The argument presented here changes these applications. You
should no longer be concerned with an increased probability of a
chance process that affects us alone, but you should be more
concerned with processes that might make extinction more probable
everywhere in the universe. To continue the above example, you
should be more concerned that a large number of asteroids have not
yet been detected than about the particular orbit of each one. You
should not worry especially about the chance that some specific
nearby star will become a supernova, but more about the chance
that supernovas are more deadly to nearby life then we believe.
Many other examples are possible.
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VI. Concluding Remarks
Since at least the time of Copernicus, physicists have been
casting doubt on the naïve view that our planet plays some unique
and special role in the universe. First it became clear that our planet
was not the center of the cosmos – that the planet Earth was just one
of the planets in our solar system. Then we gradually accumulated
evidence for the view that our solar system was itself just one of the
many such systems in the universe. These theoretical advances
contributed to a growing sense that our civilization plays no special
role in the cosmic drama, that it is just one tiny speck in a vast
universe. Thus, a series of scientific discoveries led to a series of
philosophical problems — problems about the significance of
human life, about our role in the divine plan, and so forth.
But although scientific discoveries have done a great deal to
threaten our naive worldview, they did appear to leave us with one
way of holding on to our intuitive sense that there was something
special and unique about the planet earth. We knew that our planet
was just one of the many planets in the universe, but we could
nonetheless hold on to the idea that it was the only planet that had
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certain distinctive properties — probably the only planet with
anything remotely like a human being, certainly the only one with
all the art forms, cultural traditions and political institutions that we
most associate with life on earth. The theory of inflation now shows
us that even this last claim to uniqueness was, in fact, illusory. As
Alan Guth has said, the theory shows that we do not even have “a
unique copyright on our own identities” (Quoted in Martin 2001).
This new theoretical advance casts up a set of new philosophical
questions; we have tried to begin the exploration of those questions
here.
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